Immortality: Defining the Problem

Keith Augustine

Is there life after death? This question has been asked since the dawn of civilization. It is arguably the most important and most personal question that can be asked in light of the realization of one's own mortality. Immortality is a complex issue dependent on several other philosophical questions which need to be addressed. A fundamental prerequisite for addressing the issue of immortality is to set the problem within its proper context.

Corliss Lamont defines immortality as

The literal survival of the individual human personality or consciousness for an indefinite period after [physical] death, with its memory and awareness of self-identity essentially intact (Lamont 22).

An essential fundamental distinction is the difference between survival of bodily death and immortality. Survival implies only the continued existence of personality after the physical death of the body without specifying whether that existence is eternal or eventually leads to annihilation (Edwards 2). Although arguments have been advanced which attempt to prove the indestructibility and hence immortality of the soul (e.g., Plato), these are not the concern of this essay. Nor are potential problems with the notion of eternal existence addressed. The concern of this essay is, however, the logical possibility of and evidence for or against survival of bodily death. Arguments for survival establish nothing in favor of immortality; however, arguments against survival are arguments against immortality. In other words, immortality presupposes the possibility of survival. This also means that any evidence deemed from parapsychology serves only as evidence for survival (Edwards 2). This essay will not discuss ethical arguments which attempt to establish immortality as a necessary consequent of the benevolence of an omnipotent God. This line of argument would divert us from the present topic of this paper and bring out arguments about the existence and nature of God which are beyond the scope of this essay. Rather, the arguments analyzed here will be either of a philosophical or empirical nature.

There are two fundamental positions on the question of immortality. The survival hypothesis asserts that the human personality will continue to exist in some form after the death of the physical body. The extinction hypothesis contends that the human personality will permanently extinguish after the death of the body. This distinction may seem redundant and obvious, but the necessity of this precise definition will become clear when we analyze survival theories which invoke temporary extinction. I will also assume that the burden of proof falls on the survival hypothesis because in our daily lives we know of the existence of personality only in association with the living physical organism; that is, conclusive evidence for the continued existence of personality after the death of the physical body does not exist for any of the views I will analyze.

Immortality is related to the mind-body problem and the problem of personal identity in philosophy. The mind-body problem is concerned with how the mind and body are related to each other. Personal identity is concerned with what makes a person the same person over time. I will discuss the various theories of mind and their implications for immortality later in this essay; personal identity problems will arise in the context of specific arguments about the logical possibility of immortality. Immortality is clearly related to religion and theology as a subsidiary issue. Only one form of survival, however, is overtly religious--resurrection--and the other three are consistent with a secular belief in immortality, with cryonics being the theory most consistent with a naturalistic, rather than supernatural, worldview. Although immortality is a separate issue from the existence of God, it is clearly most often considered in the context of a belief in God in the Western tradition. Thus, although it is possible to believe in God without believing in immortality or vice versa, Corliss Lamont's statement that "God would be dead if there were no immortality" would hold true for the majority of people in the Western world (Lamont 5). Indeed, in The Religious Consciousness, James Pratt writes

As the belief in miracles and special answers to prayer and in the interference of the supernatural within the natural has gradually disappeared, almost the only pragmatic value of the supernatural left to religion is the belief in a personal future life (Lamont 6).

>From the rational-empirical tradition it is clear at first glance that there are many difficulties for immortality. Kai Nielsen succinctly describes the prevailing intellectual attitude toward this issue:

Conceptions of the afterlife are so problematical that it is unreasonable for a philosophical and scientifically sophisticated person living in the west in the twentieth century to believe in life eternal, to believe that we shall survive the rotting or the burning or the mummification of our 'present bodies' (Nielsen 1).

Or freezing, I might add to Nielsen's list. This paper will attempt to determine if this prevailing intellectual view is warranted based on an in-depth analysis of the issues.

Another important distinction is the difference between personal and impersonal forms of survival. Personal survival contends that people will survive bodily death as distinct individuals. An example of impersonal survival would be the Buddhist belief in nirvana as a kind of Absolute Mind that individual minds merge or are absorbed into when enlightenment is fully realized (Edwards 2-3). This essay will focus exclusively on personal survival.

There are four "vehicles" for survival of the personality after the death of the body that will be considered: the disembodied mind, the astral body, resurrection, and post-cryonic resuscitation. These vehicles can be used alone or in combination. A disembodied mind is an immaterial, nonspatial substance which constitutes a person's mental states--a "soul". The astral body is a form of exotic matter, for in its most fundamental sense it refers to a spatial entity which has physical characteristics such as shape, size, and spatial position. These criterion must be met to distinguish the astral body from the disembodied mind. The astral body is consequently detectable in principle, but extremely difficult to detect in practice--otherwise it would be noticed leaving the body at death or perhaps during out-of-body experiences. The astral body can also be specifically envisioned as mirroring the physical body's features.

Resurrection of the body is an overt miracle from God of the Judeo-Christian and Islamic tradition and thus presupposes the truth of traditional monotheism. Thus, as Kai Nielsen points out, "if the grounds for believing in God are scant the grounds for believing in bodily resurrection are doubly scant" (Nielsen 2). This point is relevant because arguments against the existence of God are decisive arguments against resurrection; but arguments of this sort, although philosophical, are not my present concern. To isolate resurrection as a vehicle for survival, I will assume a version of resurrection which posits the extinction of personality at death and its re-creation with the resurrection of the body. Resurrection can be conceived of in two forms: the literal resurrection of the decayed corpse or the creation of a new body or "replica". It should be noted that there can be no empirical evidence in support of resurrection if it is taken to be a future event on Earth or an event that takes place in another world.

Cryonics is the procedure of preserving a body immediately after death by freezing it in the hope that future technology will be capable of resuscitating or restoring life to the preserved body. This differs from resuscitation techniques currently used in hospitals in that not only are the patients not frozen, but they are also not brain dead--which is currently an irreversible condition (Beyerstein 46). This last vehicle for survival is significantly different from the other three in that that the others are usually conceived of as applicable to all human beings, whereas in the case of post-cryonic resuscitation only those few people who have undergone "cryonic suspension" immediately after death even stand a chance of "surviving" death.

Many theories have been proposed to solve the mind-body problem. Modern materialism contends that mental states are reducible to physical brain states. Thus, if materialism is true, survival in the form of disembodied minds or astral bodies is ruled out automatically. Epiphenomenalism, which contends that the mind is a separate yet dependent by-product of the brain, has the same implications for survival. Resurrection and post-cryonic resuscitation are consistent with both of these theories of mind. A dualism that contends that the mind is a separate, independent entity from the brain is a necessary presupposition for the possibility of disembodied minds or astral bodies (Edwards 292). Resurrection is consistent with dualism if it is coupled with the notion of a soul which constitutes personality and thus does not extinguish with the body at death but continues to exist and is later rejoined to a resurrected body (Flew, "God" 108). The possibility of post-cryonic resuscitation necessarily presupposes the truth of materialism or epiphenomenalism.

Now that the problem of immortality has been clearly defined and set up within a framework of related issues which have a direct bearing on immortality, we can proceed to critically evaluate the logical possibility of survival of bodily death and the empirical evidence for or against survival. Arguments about the logical possibility of survival will primarily depend on the internal consistency of the vehicles for survival, questions about what constitutes personal identity, whether living persons can be rightly identified with post-mortem persons, and whether or not an afterlife environment is conceivable. Empirical evidence for survival will consist of alleged paranormal phenomena from parapsychology, whereas empirical evidence against survival will be from physiological psychology.

Bibliography

Beyerstein, Barry L. "The Brain and Consciousness: Implications for Psi Phenomena." In The Hundredth Monkey. Edited Kendrick Frazier. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991: 43-53.

Edwards, Paul. "Introduction." In Immortality . Edited Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1992: 1-70.

Flew, Antony. God, Freedom, and Immortality: A Critical Analysis. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1984.

Lamont, Corliss. The Illusion of Immortality. 5th ed. New York: Unger/Continuum, 1990.

Nielsen, Kai. "The Faces of Immortality." In Death and Afterlife. Edited Stephen T. Davis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989: 1-29.

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